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Federal Regulation of Third-Party
Litigation Finance
Third-party litigation finance has become a powerful and
influential industry that will continue to play a significant role in
shaping the legal landscape for years to come. The opportunities—and
challenges—introduced by this burgeoning industry are legion, and with
them has come a swath of disparate state regulations. These regimes
have failed to balance important consumer- and commercial-lending
protections with facilitation of the growth of an industry that is essential
to increasing access to the courtroom.
In response, this Note contends that a federal agency, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, should be delegated the
authority to promulgate regulations (1) capping interest rates at a
percentage in line with fair commercial practices, (2) expressly
prohibiting financier control over litigation decisions, and (3) limiting
the information that financiers can request from their clients.
Additionally, this Note proposes amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to mandate disclosure of litigation-finance agreements in all
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is worth reminding ourselves
that litigation is expensive and that litigants often struggle to meet the
expenses of the moment while they await disposition of their cases. To
bridge this gap, plaintiffs and defendants alike are increasingly turning
to a relatively new source of liquidity: their legal claims. This practice
is known as third-party litigation financing (“TPLF”), and it occurs
when someone other than the party, the party’s attorney, or a party
with a preexisting contractual relationship (i.e., an indemnitor or
insurer) agrees to provide financing for a dispute.1 The financing is for
profit and is generally nonrecourse, which means that a party is
obligated to repay the “investment” only if its lawsuit is successful.2
TPLF is based on the notion that a legal claim can be treated as an
investment, wherein financiers stand to realize immense profits3
through an investment unlike the stock market or any other asset
class.4

1.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of third-party litigation finance, such
agreements share several common traits. See Bernardo M. Cremades Román, Jr., Usury and Other
Defenses in U.S. Litigation Finance, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 151–52 (2014) (“Third-party
funding agreements typically share five common requirements: (i) a cash advance; (ii) made by a
non-party; (iii) in exchange for a share of the litigation or arbitration proceeds; (iv) whether in
settlement or judgment or award; and (v) payable at the time of recovery if, and only if, such
recovery takes place.”).
2.
Id. at 151.
3.
For example, Burford Capital, the world’s largest litigation financier, reported in 2017
that “[i]n those eight years [since Burford was founded], Burford ha[d] gone from an £80 million
start-up to one of the 250 largest public companies listed in London with a market capitalisation
well in excess of $2 billion.” BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 INTERIM REPORT 3 (2017),
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BUR-27947-Interim-Report-2017_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q23A-37HM].
4.
See Anne Rodgers et al., Emerging Issues in Third-Party Litigation Funding: What
Antitrust Lawyers Need to Know, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, art. 2, at 1–2,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec16_full_source.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NCP-A4F4] (examining the unique opportunities presented by
lawsuit investment).
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Individuals and corporate entities alike are drawn to this
newfound source of liquidity in their claims for many reasons. TPLF
plays a significant role in providing access to the courtroom for many
types of parties—from the relatively unsophisticated personal-injury
plaintiff needing to keep the bills paid until her claim is resolved, to the
sophisticated large company seeking capital to offset the risk and hefty
expense of litigation.5 Litigants’ interests in funding, paired with
investors’ potential for immense returns on investment, have spurred
the expansion of the litigation-finance industry, with the bulk of
investments lying in almost all areas of commercial litigation.6
Litigation finance is a rapidly evolving industry that infuses
billions of dollars into the judicial system every year, and yet no
comprehensive scheme of regulation has emerged in response.7 At
present, regulation of this industry consists of a patchwork of state
statutes and judicial decisions under which access to funding varies
dramatically. In states like Florida, New York, Ohio, and Texas,
litigation funding is expressly permitted and widely available.8 By
embracing TPLF, these states have exposed themselves to a range of
problems, including the potential for increases in both frivolous
lawsuits and undue influence by financiers over litigation decisions.9 In
other states, like Alabama, Colorado, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania,
litigation finance is either severely restricted or altogether unlawful.10

5.
See Michael Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous Litigation, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 195, 195–96 (2014) (“Typically, a litigation finance company will give a plaintiff
who otherwise might not be able to afford a lawsuit the funds needed to cover legal expenses.”).
6.
See Rodgers et al., supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the litigation-finance industry’s ventures
into a broad range of commercial cases).
7.
See Paul Barrett, The Business of Litigation Finance Is Booming, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-30/
the-business-of-litigation-finance-is-booming [https://perma.cc/FZ3F-VQBA] (noting that Burford
Capital had $378 million in new litigation investments in 2016 and that “Burford alone has more
than $2 billion in capital invested or available to be invested”); Elizabeth Olson, Lack of Capital to
Lead Law Firms to Seek Help, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/05/04/business/dealbook/lack-of-capital-to-lead-law-firms-to-seek-help-survey-finds.html
[https://perma.cc/97Y9-TZAR] (discussing the results of a litigation-finance survey indicating that
more companies will begin utilizing litigation finance to “fuel growth”).
8.
Texas is one example of a state regime that is friendly to litigation finance. It does not
regulate litigation finance and has case law permitting litigation-finance agreements. See AngloDutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 101, 104–05 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that
litigation-funding contracts that permit an investor to recover only if the client recovers are neither
usurious nor contrary to Texas public policy). For further discussion of how these states regulate
TPLF, see infra Section III.B.
9.
For further discussion of concerns and criticisms related to permitting litigation finance,
see infra Part II.
10. For an example of a state regime that restricts access to litigation funding, see Boling v.
Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48098, at
*14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017) (holding that litigation-finance contracts violate a Kentucky statute
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The lack of access to litigation funding in such states works to deprive
plaintiffs of an effective means of bringing meritorious claims.11
In light of the important interests at play in this burgeoning
industry, this Note advocates for the implementation of federal TPLF
regulation. This Note contends that there are many desirable aspects of
litigation finance and that a federal regulatory solution is the best
means of promoting these beneficial aspects while mitigating potential
downsides.12
Two chief principles guide this venture. First, regulation of
TPLF must occur at the federal level. The current multitude of state
regimes creates a demonstrable lack of uniformity in consumer
protection and access to funding.13 Uniformity is desirable both to
protect equal access to the courtroom and to ensure that financiers
across the United States are subject to the same consumer-protection
standards. Further, TPLF is well suited to federal regulation because it
functions in a manner very similar to, and therefore poses many of the
same issues as, those sorts of loan, investment, and credit
arrangements that the federal government has long had a hand in
regulating.14 Essential regulatory and procedural safeguards must be
put in place at the federal level to uniformly protect the interests of both
consumers and the TPLF industry. Second, there is an inherent tension
between protecting consumer interests and promoting the business
interests of the TPLF industry. The palatability of regulation for all
parties involved, insofar as a regulatory proposal might be successfully
implemented, depends on protecting properly defined consumer
interests without unduly hampering the TPLF industry’s ability to
operate and grow.
Specifically, this Note proposes that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) be charged with administering the TPLF
regulatory regime. To successfully effect the aforementioned guiding
principles, three regulatory safeguards must be implemented: (1)
interest rates must be brought in line with fair commercial practices,
proscribing champerty). For further discussion of how these states regulate TPLF, see infra
Section III.A.
11. For further discussion on concerns related to limiting access to litigation funding, see
infra Part II.
12. This Note assumes that the litigation-finance industry has become so fixed in the U.S.
judicial system that it will continue to play an important role in shaping the judicial landscape,
even though the practice remains contentious. This Note thus primarily analyzes how TPLF
should take place; for a discussion of why TPLF should be permitted, as well as common criticisms
of TPLF, see infra Part II.
13. For further discussion of the varying state approaches to TPLF, including how these
approaches impact consumer protection and access to funding, see infra Part III.
14. For an analysis of how TPLF is similar to other areas that are subject to federal
regulation, see infra Part IV.
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(2) financier control over litigation decisions must be expressly
prohibited, and (3) the information that financiers can request from
their clients must be limited so as to avoid conflict-of-interest issues
related to attorney work product and the attorney-client privilege.
Additionally, this Note proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that would mandate disclosure of TPLF agreements in
all litigation.
Part I examines the historical foundation and modern practice
of litigation finance. Part II then identifies the most important issues
in the TPLF debate and concludes that litigation financing is a
desirable practice. Part III illustrates the multitude of ways in which
states have implemented TPLF regulation. Finally, Part IV considers
the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate
litigation finance under the Commerce Clause; details why federal
regulation is preferable to state; and proposes the aforementioned
federal regulatory scheme, which would protect the interests of
consumers and litigation financiers as well as the integrity of the
judicial system as a whole.
I. TPLF PAST AND PRESENT: CHAMPERTY, USURY, AND THE MODERN
FORM
To understand how and why litigation finance is used today, it
is helpful to first understand how TPLF developed historically. This
review begins with the often-forgotten common law doctrines of
champerty and maintenance and the evolution of usury law.
A. Historical Bars to TPLF: The Prohibition on Champertous
Agreements
At common law, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance
have long prohibited the practice of TPLF.15 Maintenance is defined as
“[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a
litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case” or, in
other words, the act of “meddling in someone else’s litigation.”16
Champerty is a form of maintenance and refers to “[a]n agreement
between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which
the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for

15. See Jacqueline Sheridan, Champerty and Maintenance in the Modern Era, DINSMORE
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.dinsmore.com/publications/champerty-and-maintenance-in-themodern-era [https://perma.cc/L7CX-CEG2].
16. Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”17 In total, “maintenance is
helping another prosecute a suit,” and “champerty is maintaining a suit
in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”18
These doctrines originated in ancient Greek and Roman
societies and were later incorporated into English medieval law.19 It
was long believed that “a controversy properly concerned only the
persons actually involved in the original transaction,” and thus a
general prohibition was observed that the intermeddling of a third
party in a lawsuit voided the suit.20
These doctrines were incorporated into U.S. common law, but
over time, they have weakened such that courts today are far less
willing than their historical antecedents were to invalidate an
agreement as champertous. Near the end of the nineteenth century,
some courts began upholding agreements that were traditionally
viewed as champertous. For example, in 1891, the Oregon Supreme
Court in Brown v. Bigne held that an agreement by a third party to fund
a suit was not champertous where a third party was induced by the
plaintiff to fund the suit because the plaintiff could not fund the
litigation himself.21 Judge Bean neatly summarized the shifting view in
the United States, noting that in England, “[s]o great was the evil of
rich and powerful barons buying up claims, . . . that it became
necessary . . . to prevent such practices, and to invoke in all its rigor the
doctrine against champerty and maintenance.”22 But with regard to the
United States, Judge Bean stated:
In this country, where no aristocracy or privileged class elevated above the mass of the
people has ever existed, and the administration of justice has been alike impartial to all
without regard to rank or station, the reason for the ancient doctrine of champerty and
maintenance does not exist, and hence has not found favor in the United States.23

The Brown v. Bigne court found that while a majority of the states
continued to observe the doctrine of champerty, others had disregarded
it entirely.24 The court concluded that agreements that would
traditionally be viewed as champertous are “not unlawful, unless . . .
made for the mere purpose or desire of perpetuating strife and
litigation.”25

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978).
Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 48 (1935).
Id. at 54.
28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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This trend continued gaining steam, and during the latter
decades of the twentieth century, contingency fees became widely
recognized and accepted as an exception to champerty.26 Today, as the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently noted, “The
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding,
champerty’s reach.”27 TPLF has proven to be no exception to this trend,
as nearly half of all states now allow some form of litigation finance.28
Through this doctrinal relaxation, TPLF agreements have risen to
prominence as a form of “permissible champerty,” though allowance of
such agreements varies immensely among the states.29
For example, a Delaware superior court recently held that a
plaintiff’s agreement with a litigation funder, wherein the plaintiff
received funding in exchange for a percentage of any future proceeds of
the litigation, was not barred as champertous because the plaintiff
retained ownership of the claim and the funder was given no authority
to maintain the claim.30 But in a Kentucky case involving a very similar
funding arrangement, a federal district court held that a state statute
proscribing champerty barred litigation-funding agreements.31
B. Historical Bars to TPLF: The Prohibition on Usury
Usury is defined as “the charging of an illegal rate of interest as
a condition to lending money.”32 Under English law, the charging of any
interest rate was illegal until the sixteenth century, at which time
26. See Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing
claim in a case involving a contingency fee agreement because “there [was] no allegation that [the
attorney] undertook to pay or protect the client from payment of the costs and expenses of
litigation, an essential element of champerty properly pleaded”).
27. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011).
28. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 122 (2011) (noting
that “almost half of the jurisdictions in the United States allow some form of profit maintenance,
and a few arguably have lifted all restrictions on maintenance under their common law”).
29. For further discussion of the various statutory and judicial actions that states have taken
with regard to TPLF agreements, see infra Part III.
30. See Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. N07C-12-134JRJ, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 118, at *8–12 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2016) (holding that plaintiff
was the “the bona fide owner of the claims in this litigation, and [litigation funder] Burford has no
right to maintain this action”).
31. Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48098, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017).
32. Usury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas.
206, 206–07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802), Judge Thompson helpfully stated:
Usury consists in extorting or taking a rate of interest for money, beyond what is
allowed by law. It is not necessary that money should be actually advanced, in order to
constitute the offence of usury, but any pretence or contrivance whatever, to gain more
than legal interest, where it is the intent of the parties to contract for a loan, will make
that contract usurious.
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courts began to enforce loans with interest rates below the usury
ceiling—ten percent at the time.33 The usury ceiling continued declining
over the next several centuries, reaching a low point of five percent in
the nineteenth century.34 As Professor Eric Posner has noted, “[P]arties
at all times attempted to contract around the usury ceiling, but the
courts of equity generally resisted the most obvious attempts at evasion,
and the evidence indicates that the usury laws did restrict the small
loan market.”35 In the United States, most states today have passed
statutes establishing maximum interest rates (ranging from six to
twenty percent)—which typically vary depending on the type of
agreement—and penalties for usury.36
As early as 1830, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the elements
of a usurious transaction.37 Establishing usury generally requires a
showing of (1) a loan or forbearance of money, (2) an absolute obligation
to repay the principal (not contingent on any event), and (3) greater
compensation for the loan (e.g., interest) than is allowed under
statute.38 Litigation-funding agreements are typically structured as
nonrecourse so as to avoid the second requirement, but such a structure
has not always been entirely successful in protecting TPLF agreements
from usury law.39
Because TPLF agreements are generally nonrecourse, courts
have largely construed them as financing agreements rather than as
loans.40 Bernardo Cremades has argued that the underlying rationale
rests on “the inherent contingent nature of such contracts or, more
precisely, the risk born [sic] by the lender.”41 Cremades notes that
“[s]uch risk, however, must be substantial and thus a mere colorable
hazard will not preclude excessive interest charges from being
usurious.”42 To avoid usury, a lender must be “subject to some greater
33. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 312 (1995).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Cremades, supra note 1, at 160.
37. See Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 205, 224 (1830) (identifying the requisite elements
necessary to establish a usurious transaction as (1) “[a] loan either express or implied”; (2) “[a]n
understanding that the money lent shall or may be returned”; and (3) “[t]hat a greater rate of
interest than is allowed by the statute, shall be paid”).
38. See Cremades, supra note 1, at 160.
39. See Bernardo M. Cremades Román, Implications of Usury in Third-Party Litigation
Funding, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/
implications-of-usury-in-third-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/47TJ-82V3].
40. Cremades, supra note 1, at 162.
41. Cremades, supra note 39.
42. Id.
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hazard than the mere risk that the borrower might fail to repay the loan
or that the security might depreciate in value,” and to that end, some
courts have found that litigation poses a substantial risk.43
Other courts have relied on usury laws to void TPLF agreements
with excessive interest rates. For example, a New York trial court in a
strict liability labor case found “low, if any risk” of the litigation funder
not recovering and thought it “ludicrous to consider this transaction
anything else but a loan.”44 In North Carolina, a state court of appeals
found that a TPLF agreement was an investment but concluded that
the investment constituted a “cash advance” subject to the state’s usury
law.45 In total, the application of usury law to TPLF agreements, much
like the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, varies significantly
from state to state.
C. Defining the Modern Forms of TPLF
Today, TPLF comprises two chief funding subindustries—
consumer and commercial—each with its own unique funding
arrangements for different types of clients.46 TPLF is typically provided
to plaintiffs but is also available to defendants. The latter form is far
less common, as it is considerably more difficult to value the likelihood
of “success” for a defendant.47
Plaintiff funding is typically nonrecourse, which means that a
plaintiff has no obligation to repay an advance if he loses his suit. Only
if there is a recovery may the financier take the agreed-upon percentage
along with interest accrued on the loan amount.48 Defendant funding is
generally structured as a reverse contingency fee, “whereby the capital
provider receives an interest in the differential between a defendant’s
exposure and the amount of the claim that is ultimately paid.”49 For
43. Id.
44. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 894, at *22–23
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005).
45. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
46. Cremades, supra note 1, at 155.
47. See
Guide
to
Litigation
Financing,
WESTFLEET
ADVISORS
3–4,
http://westfleetadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/WA-Guide-to-Litigation-Financing.pdf
(last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/SJ5Z-MPYX] (discussing the types of parties and
claims that typically receive TPLF).
48. See FAQ, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/3UKH-BH3Z] (“Our capital is almost always non-recourse—meaning that we do
not earn an investment return if the underlying litigation is unsuccessful.”); Our Value
Proposition, JURIDICA INV. LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/our-valueproposition (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9TTY-2R9L] (stating that Juridica
provides nonrecourse capital to businesses and law firms).
49. See Guide to Litigation Financing, supra note 47, at 3 (detailing how defendant TPLF is
used); see also Michael McDonald, Litigation Finance for Defendants, ABOVE L. (Mar. 28, 2017,
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both plaintiff and defendant financing, the TPLF model allows parties
to shift the risk of an unsuccessful suit to the litigation financier.50
TPLF is appealing primarily because it allows litigants to
eliminate some of the risk of an unsuccessful suit. For TPLF to work as
a business model, then, financiers must be able to evaluate the risk they
are assuming; this includes the likelihood of both recovering litigation
costs and profiting from their investments.51 To determine whether a
risk is justified, TPLF providers engage in a process of due diligence,
the depth of which varies depending on the type of funding sought and
the complexity of the claim.
1. Consumer-Litigation Financing
Consumer-litigation finance deals primarily with personalinjury, divorce, and small claims in which the plaintiff is typically not
well funded.52 During the course of litigation, and occasionally after
resolution,53 a plaintiff can receive nonrecourse funding at the cost of
principal plus interest and fees out of the proceeds of the lawsuit.54 The
funding advanced usually ranges from $500 to $100,000, and interest

5:31 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/litigation-finance-for-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/
D6V7-KRUW] (“If the litigation finance firm wants to [fund a defendant], they assign an expected
loss or damages amount to the case. Then any amount below the expected damages is the value
generated by the litigation finance firm, which gets a portion of that value.”).
50. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 6 (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJH8-EL97] [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER].
51. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED
STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1, 24 (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCL5-PEKU] (“The main
costs of ALF [alternative-litigation-financing] suppliers associated with a particular deal are costs
associated with evaluating prospects for repayment (i.e., due diligence costs) and opportunity costs
of capital (i.e., costs associated with having money tied up).” (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted)).
52. See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460
(2012) (noting that consumer-TPLF clients are typically less sophisticated than commercial-TPLF
clients).
53. In some cases, it can take from several weeks to several years for a settlement to be paid,
which prompts consumers in need of financial support to seek funding after the disposition of their
cases. See Post-Settlement Lawsuit Funding for Plaintiffs, BALANCED BRIDGE FUNDING,
https://www.balancedbridge.com/post-settlement-plaintiff-funding (last visited Jan. 21, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/5P6R-2AFQ] (detailing the process of obtaining post-settlement funding).
54. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another Form of
Payday Lending?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2017, at 117, 117.

Popp_Galley (Do Not Delete)

2019]

THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE

3/25/2019 11:04 PM

737

rates vary from two to fifteen percent per month (resulting in annual
percentage rates55 of over two hundred percent).56
Financing can be obtained in person or online, where a financier
gauges the strength of a consumer’s case by looking to factors such as
the amount of potential damages, the likelihood of gaining a profitable
settlement or winning at trial, and whether the consumer owes other
debts or attorney’s fees that would need to be satisfied first.57 Upon
recovery and after all other debts and obligations are paid, the attorney
disburses repayment to the financier.
Consumer-TPLF plaintiffs are generally referred to as
“unsophisticated,” meaning they do not possess the same level of
negotiating power as do larger commercial entities or law firms.58
Scholars have expressed concern that this asymmetry exposes
consumers to a greater risk of abusive practices than their commercial
counterparts.59 Such practices generally consist of either influence over
litigation strategy or the charging of exorbitant interest rates, which
would typically be illegal were this type of finance governed by most
states’ usury laws.60
Due diligence in consumer-litigation financing is fairly
straightforward. It involves an assessment of the likelihood of a claim’s
success and any relevant debts that will need to be paid from the
proceeds of the suit.61 Because the average financing involved in
consumer litigation is low, the amount of money a financier would be
willing to spend on due diligence is also relatively low.62 Predictably,
reduced diligence results in a less complete picture of a plaintiff’s

55. Annual percentage rate (“APR”) is “[t]he actual cost of borrowing money, expressed in the
form of an annualized interest rate.” Annual Percentage Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
56. Skiba & Xiao, supra note 54, at 122.
57. See id. at 122–23.
58. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics: Paying
Interest, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 17–18 (suggesting that allowing private lenders to exercise a certain
degree of control over litigation strategy may violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); see
also Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV.
615, 648–49 (2007) (stating that numerous state bar associations and jurisdictions have issued
opinions offering guidance on the ethical limits of third-party financiers’ ability to control litigation
strategy).
59. See McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 627 (discussing how legal scholarship has supported
the use of litigation-finance agreements, despite “the unequal bargaining position of the customer
and the LFC [litigation financier], the financial duress prompting the customer to sign an LLA
[litigation-funding agreement], the usurious profit reaped by the LFCs, and the ethical pressures
placed on the attorney-client relationship”).
60. See id.
61. See Skiba & Xiao, supra note 54, at 123.
62. See GARBER, supra note 51, at 24–25 (noting that in consumer TPLF, “individual
transactions in this segment are fairly small, perhaps in the range of $1,750 to $4,500”).
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likelihood of success, which increases the risk to consumer financiers
through variations in returns on their portfolios.63 For those consumerTPLF providers with sufficient capital to fund many suits at once,
however, “portfolio risk—that is, variation in the returns on the
portfolio—can be fairly small because of risk pooling across deals.”64
2. Commercial-Litigation Financing
Commercial-litigation finance is typically arranged for disputes
involving antitrust, intellectual property, and business-contract
issues.65 Commercial-TPLF financiers normally provide funding
directly to corporate plaintiffs in exchange for a share of the recovery,
though funding may be extended to defendants as well.66
Commercial-TPLF clients employ TPLF services for several
reasons. One is that TPLF can be used as a financing technique for
budgetary or accounting-management purposes (where the party could
afford the litigation costs otherwise).67 Another reason commercial
plaintiffs use TPLF is to overcome financial constraints in pursuing
litigation.68 This rationale typically applies to smaller businesses or
individuals with commercial interests who could not ordinarily afford
litigation.69 TPLF can also be used “to obtain assessments of the legal
merits and likely economic values of their claims to supplement those
provided by their outside counsel.”70 Further, because obtaining
financing may indicate to opposing parties that a claim has been judged
to have considerable merit, “some companies might accept [TPLF] (and
reveal this to the other side) in hopes of strengthening their bargaining
positions in settlement negotiations.”71
Investments in commercial-litigation finance tend to be much
larger than in the consumer context, and financiers stand to obtain
immense returns on their investments. While it is difficult to obtain
information about the dealings of most commercial-litigation financiers,
there is substantial information available about Burford Capital (the

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Steinitz, supra note 52, at 460.
66. See GARBER, supra note 51, at 13.
67. See Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 711, 716–17 (2014). Because wealthier individuals possess more capital and are generally
more aware of their negotiating power, they are more “sophisticated” in the sense that they can
even out their bargaining position relative to litigation financiers.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GARBER, supra note 51, at 15.
71. Id.
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world’s largest provider of commercial TPLF) and Juridica
Investments, because both of these companies are subject to disclosure
requirements as publicly traded corporations. Burford and Juridica
both generally deal with large, wealthy companies that are seeking at
least $2 million in funding. Burford’s website indicates that “[c]lients,
firms and Burford get the best value when the amount requested is at
least $2 million. Most of our investments are between $4 and $10
million, and some are significantly larger.”72 Juridica’s website states
that “[i]nvestment size typically ranges from US $2,000,000 to US
$10,000,000, although larger investments in exceptional opportunities
or a portfolio of opportunities are made.”73
Litigation-funding arrangements by Bentham IMF, another of
the world’s largest litigation financiers, provide one example of what
commercial-TPLF agreements can look like. In a typical funding
agreement for a single case, “Bentham will pay 50 percent of the client’s
legal fees in exchange for 20 percent of any recovery. The law firm
agrees to defer the other 50 percent of its fees in exchange for also
receiving a 20 percent interest in the recovery.”74
Commercial-TPLF clients are generally more “sophisticated”
than those in consumer financing. These clients include both companies
and wealthy individuals who possess more resources than do consumerTPLF clients and are more likely to recognize the negotiating power in
their claims.75 Because the parties in commercial TPLF have essentially
equal negotiating power, it is far less likely that financiers will be able
to take advantage of clients through excessive interest rates.
Nevertheless, commercial TPLF still raises concerns of increased
frivolous litigation and undue influence over litigation strategy.76
In the commercial context, the due diligence process is much
more involved. Not only is there far more money on the line, but the
litigation at issue in commercial TPLF tends to be more complex than
in its consumer counterpart.77 Thus, the cost of due diligence tends to
be much higher. For example, Burford builds a comprehensive “risk
72. Emily O. Slater, Demystifying the Litigation Finance Diligence Process, BURFORD (Sept.
18,
2017),
http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/demystifying-litigation-finance-diligence
[https://perma.cc/BR83-DWFH].
73. Investment Policy, JURIDICA INV. LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com/aboutjuridica/investment-policy.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/32GE-R3PF].
74. Joan C. Rogers, Litigation Funding on Rise in Big Cases, Panel Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
23, 2017), https://www.bna.com/litigation-funding-rise-n57982085617 [https://perma.cc/J23B4VB7].
75. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 67, at 716.
76. For further discussion of the criticisms of commercial-litigation funding, see infra Section
II.B.
77. GARBER, supra note 51, at 26.
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profile” for each client that assesses six separate criteria: (1) type of
matter, (2) strength of the merits, (3) experience of counsel, (4)
jurisdiction, (5) amount of capital required, and (6) expected recovery.78
Juridica engages in a similar process, where “[u]ltimately,
Juridica seeks to invest in claims that are likely to be resolved through
settlement in a reasonable time frame.”79 In 2010, Juridica’s chairman
and CEO stated that the due diligence process is “a very detailed and
expensive process, averaging about 60 to 90 days” and that “Juridica
spends an average of $75,000–$100,000 for each screening.”80 This
expense can include the enlistment of outside legal resources for specific
practice areas and economic and financial consultants to evaluate
damages.81
II. COMMON OBJECTIONS TO TPLF
In February 2012, the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 filed
a white paper with the ABA House of Delegates that detailed the impact
of TPLF on legal ethics.82 The Commission found that “[t]he market for
alternative litigation finance involves suppliers and customers who
demand this form of financing” and that the use of TPLF “will
undoubtedly continue to evolve.”83 Though ambivalent about the use of
TPLF generally, the Commission reached essentially the same
conclusion as this Note: that the TPLF industry is likely to continue
growing and that special steps must be taken to protect clients using
TPLF services.
The Commission limited its recommendations to legal ethics
alone, but many of the ethical concerns they identified are helpful to
both understanding what motivated the current patchwork of state
78. According to Burford Capital’s website, their risk profile includes an evaluation of
whether
[t]he case does not turn on a “he-said-she-said” credibility determination[, t]here is more
than one viable legal theory that could lead to a recovery[, t]he legal theory is tested
and has good support in statutory or case-law[, t]he case theory makes sense in the
commercial context of the transaction or course of dealing[, t]he damages theory can be
reasonably extrapolated from past performance of the damaged company or there is an
established contract, statutory or royalty rate[, and t]he economics of the investment
do not depend on the case settling early or on obtaining treble damages[.]
Slater, supra note 72.
79. See Investment Policy, supra note 73.
80. Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major Commercial
Lawsuits, FULBROOK CAP. MGMT., LLC (Mar. 10, 2010), https://fulbrookmanagement.com/thirdparty-investors-offer-new-funding-source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/39WX8PQX].
81. Id.
82. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50.
83. Id. at 39.
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regulations84 and formulating an overarching federal regulatory
solution.85 To meaningfully approach these matters, it is useful, then,
to first address the arguments supporting and opposing the practice of
TPLF. This Part examines the most common arguments on both sides
of the TPLF debate and explains why the criticisms are not
insurmountable barriers to the use of litigation financing.
A. Increased Filing of Frivolous Claims
The oldest and most common objection to litigation finance is
that the practice may increase the filing of frivolous claims. The
Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”) has argued that “TPLF companies
are mere investors—and they base their funding decisions on the
present value of their expected return, of which the likelihood of success
at trial is only one component.”86 The ILR argues that because litigation
financiers can spread risk over a large number of cases in their
portfolios, TPLF providers “can be expected to have higher risk
appetites than most contingency-fee attorneys and to be more willing to
back claims of questionable merit.”87
In terms of commercial-litigation finance, concerns over
frivolous litigation are entirely unfounded. Commercial-TPLF
financiers engage in an expensive and time-consuming process of due
diligence to ensure that claims are precisely the opposite of frivolous.88
The objective of these financiers is to see a return on their investments,
and investing in suits that already have a high likelihood of being
dismissed during the pleadings or disposed of on summary judgment
would make for a poor business practice.89 To the contrary, then, the
due diligence process yields the positive effect of promoting meritorious
claims and facilitates the bringing of these claims.90

84. See infra Part III.
85. See infra Part IV.
86. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL
TO
REGULATE
THIRD-PARTY
INVESTMENTS
IN
LITIGATION
4
(2012),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
W4FS-X4A2].
87. Id.
88. See supra Section I.C.2 (examining the due diligence process in commercial-litigation
funding).
89. See Douglas R. Richmond, Litigation Funding: Investing, Lending, or Loan Sharking?,
2005 SYMP. ISSUE PROF. LAW. 17, 27 (noting that “funding companies have no incentive to advance
money to plaintiffs whose lawsuits might reasonably be described as frivolous because their chance
of recovery is low”).
90. See id. (“[B]ecause the merits of a case exist independent of a plaintiff’s ability to afford
litigation, prohibiting litigation funding will in some instances discourage meritorious lawsuits.”).
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Concerns about an increase in frivolous litigation are more
salient in the consumer-TPLF context because of the model on which
consumer financiers operate, but this is largely inconsequential.
Although consumer financiers could conceivably be more likely to invest
in frivolous suits because of both their ability to spread risk across many
claims and their lesser ability to engage in due diligence, it is not at all
obvious that relatively simpler consumer claims require the heightened
diligence of commercial TPLF to serve this gatekeeping function.
Moreover, other mechanisms prevent the filing and maintenance of
frivolous litigation.
One such mechanism is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. At
the federal level, lawyers are required to certify that submissions to the
court are not presented for an improper purpose, that arguments are
nonfrivolous or supported by existing law, and that factual assertions
have or are likely to have evidentiary support.91 Failing to observe the
rule can result in a range of sanctions, which include “nonmonetary
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation.”92 Many states have
adopted a similar rule and provide for similar sanctions.93
Another mechanism to prevent frivolous lawsuits is the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which most states have adopted
in some form.94 Rule 3.1 requires that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.”95 In the TPLF context, this rule and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 both serve to prevent frivolous litigation by
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
93. See, e.g., MASS. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“The signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.”); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13 (requiring that the signature of attorneys or parties certify “to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment” and
that violators be held guilty of contempt).
94. For a list of states that have adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see
Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pro
fessional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html
[https://perma.cc/W4GD-P463].
Most states, however, amended the rules upon or after adoption. See Jurisdictional Rules
Comparison Charts, A.B.A. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html [https://perma.cc/2SZY-2PP4].
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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disincentivizing lawyers from bringing such suits, thus limiting the
ability of TPLF financiers to back them.
B. Improper Influence over Litigation Strategy
Another common objection to litigation finance involves TPLF’s
possible influence on litigation decisions and settlement incentives.
This influence could be effected through two means. First, as the ILR
has noted, “[T]he TPLF company [as an investor in a plaintiff’s lawsuit]
presumably will seek to protect its investment, and can be expected to
try to exert control over the plaintiff’s strategic decisions.”96 Second,
because a TPLF consumer must pay the financier with the proceeds of
the lawsuit, the consumer might feel pressured to resist settlement in
hopes of receiving a larger sum of money.97
With regard to the first concern, most financiers are aware of the
ethical issues this practice would raise and accordingly disclaim control
over strategy or settlement decisions.98 The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct also address this issue by restricting limitations
on an attorney’s independent judgment. According to commentary
accompanying Rule 1.7, “Loyalty and independent judgment are
essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”99
Additionally, Rule 1.8(f) states that a lawyer shall not accept
compensation from a third party unless “there is no interference with
the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship.”100 But given that these rules govern only attorney
conduct, these measures alone are likely insufficient to mitigate
concerns over financier control.
With regard to the second concern, litigation financing serves to
lessen any resource disparity between the parties that might otherwise
impact settlement decisions. Because financiers have a strong incentive
not to fund frivolous litigation,101 TPLF actually promotes the
settlement of meritorious claims. This is because TPLF “forc[es] a
recalcitrant defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmatically
in light of the fact that its adversary has the resources to meaningfully

96. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 4–5.
97. Id. at 5.
98. See FAQ, supra note 48 (“We don’t get any rights to manage the litigation in which we
invest, unless a client sells us a judgment or engages us specifically to manage as well as finance
litigation. . . . Nor do we get any rights to control the settlement of the litigation . . . .”).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f).
101. See Richmond, supra note 89, at 27.
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prosecute the matter.”102 Thus, while TPLF agreements may lead some
plaintiffs to resist settlement based solely on their TPLF contracts, the
benefits of TPLF in promoting the settlement of meritorious claims
outweigh this burden.
Accordingly, this Note proposes a regulatory solution that
details an absolute prohibition of any decisionmaking authority by the
financier over strategic litigation decisions.103 And to better alleviate
concerns over settlement incentives, this Note also proposes several
limitations on TPLF agreements to soften their influence on case
disposition.104
C. Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Protection
Waivers
Another significant concern is that communications between
attorneys and TPLF financiers may constitute a waiver of attorneyclient privilege or attorney work product protection.105 By satisfying a
financier’s demands during the due diligence process, an attorney may
be required to disclose information within the scope of the privilege or
the work product doctrine, thus rendering the information discoverable
by opposing counsel.106
This concern poses a real obstacle to the use of TPLF, but it can
be managed, as financiers typically only request information that is
ordinarily discoverable by the opposing party anyway.107 To ensure this
remains the case, this Note proposes express limitations on the types of
information financiers may request, thus preserving these protections
while still facilitating the ability of financiers to engage in due
diligence.108

102. Id.
103. See infra Section IV.C.
104. See infra Section IV.C.
105. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 381 (2009)
(“[T]here are work product and privilege issues that must be addressed if information is to be
shared with a third party seeking to price and assume litigation risk from a defendant.”); see also
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 6 (“TPLF investments compromise the
attorney-client relationship and diminish the professional independence of attorneys by inserting
a new party into the litigation equation whose sole interest is making a profit on its investment.”).
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
107. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 186 (2014)
(“[M]ost of the information that a third-party funder will need to evaluate a lawsuit is factual
information of the sort that is discoverable by the adversary in any event.”).
108. See infra Section IV.C.
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III. THE “RULES” OF LITIGATION FINANCE: DIVERGENT STATE
APPROACHES
Today, the “rules” of litigation finance are an amalgam of statelevel legislative enactments and court decisions.109 TPLF is not
currently regulated at the federal level, and state regulation varies
immensely. In 2007, Maine became the first state to pass legislation
regulating litigation-finance agreements.110 A number of states have
since followed, including Oklahoma,111 Nebraska,112 and Ohio.113
Several more states are presently considering legislation that would
regulate TPLF agreements, and it is likely that the complex state-based
framework of regulation will continue to grow.114
The broad range of state approaches to TPLF regulation has
resulted in a number of substantive differences in how consumers and
financiers across the country engage in TPLF. These differences arise
from whether agreement-disclosure requirements are imposed, how
underwriting is performed, and how private citizens obtain funding
compared to corporations, among other differences.115 Further, because
states disagree over whether TPLF should be permitted in the first

109. See Mikey Abts, The Current State of Litigation Finance Legislation: Part 1, LITIG. FIN.
J. (June 2, 2017), https://litigationfinancejournal.com/current-state-litigation-finance-legislation
[https://perma.cc/WS2S-9YHY] (examining the different attempts by state legislatures to regulate
litigation finance).
110. See Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices, ch. 394, 2007 Me. Laws 965
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to -107 (2008)); Steinitz & Field, supra note 67,
at 714 (discussing early state efforts to regulate litigation financing).
111. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, §§ 3-801 to -817 (2018) (setting forth licensing and bond
requirements for TPLF financiers, contract specifications, and a range of prohibited activities and
conduct).
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3306 (2018) (establishing that communication between an attorney
and TPLF provider as it pertains to nonrecourse litigation funding shall not “limit, waive, or
abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or common-law privilege, including the work-product
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege”).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2018) (establishing that TPLF agreements are
valid and enforceable, provided they satisfy a number of contractual requirements).
114. South Carolina is one of the states currently considering regulating litigation finance. On
February 8, 2017, legislation was introduced in the South Carolina Senate contemplating the
imposition of certain requirements on consumer-litigation-funding companies. The legislation’s
stated goal is to
require a consumer litigation funding company to make certain disclosures on a
litigation financing contract, to prohibit a consumer litigation funding company from
taking certain actions, to require a consumer litigation funding company to provide
notice and documents to a consumer’s attorney if the consumer is represented by
counsel, and to require a consumer litigation funding company to submit an annual
report containing certain information related to the company’s business and operations.
S. 390, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017).
115. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
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place, the ability of consumers to even obtain TPLF services is
geographically dependent.
Sections III.A and III.B provide a broad outline of the various
ways in which states have attempted to address and regulate TPLF.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, its purposes are to
highlight the more common state solutions to TPLF, to demonstrate the
inherent tension among states’ approaches, and to examine how the
lack of uniformity impacts consumer and commercial interests across
the country.
A. Prohibiting or Strongly Regulating TPLF
In terms of the regulation and enforceability of TPLF
agreements, a number of states are widely regarded as being hostile to
litigation finance. Through either judicial pronouncement or
legislation, these states have prohibited or strongly regulated TPLF.
For those states that have dealt with litigation finance through
judicial pronouncement, Alabama is perhaps the harshest. In Wilson v.
Harris, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that a litigationfinance agreement was void under an Alabama statute prohibiting
gambling contracts and further held that TPLF is generally contrary to
the public policy against champertous agreements.116
Colorado has also addressed litigation financing through judicial
pronouncement. In Oasis Legal Finance Group, LLC v. Coffman, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that TPLF agreements are loans
(regardless of whether the duty to repay is on a contingency) and are
thus subject to state usury laws.117 In doing so, the court “effectively
disregarded express contract provisions,” and so “there is reason to
think that Colorado courts will interpret litigation finance contracts
very loosely and will not respect the strict terms of the agreement.”118
Other states appear to have outlawed litigation-finance
agreements through legislation. In Kentucky, the relevant statute
provides:
Any contract, agreement or conveyance made in consideration of services to be rendered
in the prosecution or defense, or aiding in the prosecution or defense, in or out of court, of
any suit, by any person not a party on record in the suit, whereby the thing sued for or in

116. 688 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
117. 361 P.3d 400, 407–09 (Colo. 2015) (holding that the litigation-finance agreement “creates
‘debt’ because it creates an obligation to repay” and that an unconditional obligation to repay is
not required to subject the agreement to state usury laws as a loan).
118. Michael McDonald, The Best and Worst States for Litigation Finance (Part II), ABOVE L.
(July 11, 2017, 5:33 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/the-best-and-worst-states-for-litigation
-finance-part-ii [https://perma.cc/R75T-3HQ2].
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controversy or any part thereof, is to be taken, paid or received for such services or
assistance, is void.119

On its face, this statute would appear to render litigation-finance
agreements void, though there is no Kentucky case law explicitly
addressing this point. In a recent federal case, however, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky surmised that the
Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that litigation-finance
agreements violate the Kentucky statute proscribing champerty and
the public policy of the commonwealth.120
Finally, in some states that have begun to allow TPLF, strict
requirements have been imposed on the amount of interest that
litigation funders can charge.121 For example, a Tennessee statute
prohibits litigation financiers from charging an interest rate above ten
percent.122 In imposing such a limit on TPLF agreements, Tennessee
has brought the practice more in line with the mainstream
understanding of nonusurious interest rates.123
B. Allowing or Lightly Regulating TPLF
On the other end of the spectrum, many states are more
welcoming (or at least less hostile) to the practice of TPLF. These states
have largely addressed the practice through either judicial
pronouncement or legislation as well, and at least one state has
employed its attorney general’s office to lightly regulate TPLF
financiers.
Among the states that have addressed litigation funding
through judicial pronouncement, the broadest endorsement comes from
a Texas court of appeals, in Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc.

119. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (West 2018).
120. See Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00081-GNS-HBB, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48098, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2017) (“In light of the undecided question of
Kentucky law at issue, the Court concludes that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that the
Agreements violate Kentucky public policy and the statute proscribing champerty for the reasons
articulated in Stice.”).
121. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-16-101 to -110 (2018) (“All consumers entering into litigation
financing transactions shall pay the litigation financier an annual fee of not more than ten percent
(10%) of the original amount of money provided to the consumer for the litigation financing
transaction.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 2251–2260 (2018); H.R. 1340, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2015) (stating that the bill “[s]ets forth certain requirements and prohibitions with
respect to CPAP transactions, including limits on the funded amount and specifications for the
CPAP contract amount”).
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-110(a).
123. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of modern usury laws.
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v. Haskell.124 There, the court held that TPLF agreements are generally
enforceable and that usury laws do not apply to them.125
Like Texas courts, Florida courts have held that litigationfinance agreements are enforceable.126 In Kraft v. Mason, a district
court of appeal rejected the argument that the doctrine of champerty
posed an absolute bar to litigation finance, but it did not explicitly
recognize that usury laws do not apply to litigation-finance
agreements.127 It is unlikely, however, that usury law would be applied
specifically to nonrecourse TPLF, as other Florida courts have held that
nonrecourse lending is not subject to usury laws.128
New York courts have also expressly recognized the
enforceability of litigation-finance agreements.129 Additionally, the New
York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection, a division of the New
York Attorney General’s Office, has undertaken a light form of
regulation by entering into an agreement with a number of litigation
funders, which is aimed at protecting consumers from entering finance
contracts without a full understanding of the terms and their effect. 130
The agreement requires that “the consumer may cancel the contract
within five business days following the consumer’s receipt of funds,
without penalty or further obligation.”131
As an example of statutory regulation, Ohio has passed
legislation directly regulating litigation finance.132 Unlike the strict
limits imposed by Tennessee and other states,133 Ohio’s limits are fairly
minimal. Contracts must include various disclosures,134 attorneys
cannot be required to have any duties contrary to the state’s rules of
124. See 193 S.W.3d 87, 104–05 (Tex. App. 2006) (“[W]e hold that the agreements do not violate
Texas public policy.”).
125. Id. (holding that “agreements that are ‘champertous in nature’ ” are not automatically
void).
126. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]his court holds
that the trial court correctly found the contract in issue was neither champertous nor
usurious . . . .”).
127. Id.
128. See McDonald, supra note 118 (noting that litigation financiers place “particular
emphasis [on Florida], in part due to the size of the state, but also because of settled case law”).
129. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 894, at *18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“Under New York law these assignments are allowed as long as the
primary purpose and intent of the assignment was for some reason other then [sic] bringing suit
on that assignment.”).
130. New York AG Agreement with Legal Funding Companies, MIGHTY (Aug. 2, 2015),
https://www.mighty.com/blog/nyattorneygeneralplaintifffundingagreement
[https://perma.cc/
FFP9-UWJB].
131. Id.
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2018).
133. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-16-101 to -110 (2018).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(1).
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professional conduct,135 and consumers must be permitted to cancel the
contract without penalty within five business days of receipt of funds.136
The level of interest that financiers may charge is not limited.
IV. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SOLUTION
TPLF is a burgeoning industry that will continue to have a
significant and lasting impact on the U.S. legal system. Through usury
law and the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty,
states have addressed the rise of TPLF in a multitude of ways. This has
ultimately led to a web of piecemeal regulations that have failed to
uniformly protect important consumer interests or facilitate access to
litigation funding. Because neither the beneficial nor the detrimental
effects of TPLF are being adequately managed by state regimes, federal
oversight is needed to ensure consumer and financier interests are
balanced.
Federal regulation is preferable to state regulation for several
reasons. First, federal regulation creates uniformity by establishing a
single regime to oversee TPLF in all fifty states. Aside from promoting
a general interest in fairness by ensuring access to litigation finance
nationwide, a uniform system of regulation would eliminate forumshopping issues. Because some states are far more hostile to litigation
finance than others, TPLF financiers are most likely to do business in
those states with the most relaxed rules and thus the weakest
oversight.137 Federal regulation would eliminate the need for litigants
to enter choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, thus allowing all
TPLF consumers to be accorded the same degree of protection. Further,
uniform regulation ensures that consumers will not be unduly coerced
into these contracts by financiers that target jurisdictions with the least
restrictive litigation-finance lending requirements and thus the least
protection of consumer interests.138

135. Id. § 1349.55(C).
136. Id. § 1349.55(B)(2).
137. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 9 (noting concerns with “a
checkerboard of disparate state laws, rules, and regulations that apply only within any given state,
and which, owing to the differences among the state oversight regimes, likely would funnel TPLFfinanced cases to the state courts in the jurisdictions with the weakest oversight regimes”).
138. See Michael McDonald, The Best and Worst States for Litigation Finance (Part I), ABOVE
L. (June 28, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/06/the-best-and-worst-states-forlitigation-finance-part-i [https://perma.cc/4STD-HBJ5] (noting that choice-of-law and choice-offorum clauses are used to control TPLF agreements under the jurisdiction of states who have
shown acceptance of these agreements).
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Litigation financing is also frequently used to fund the most
expensive and complex suits, which often end up in federal court.139 It
is therefore logical, as will be discussed in further detail below, to
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to effect an important
procedural reform.
In total, the inherent dangers of TPLF are not adequately
addressed under the current patchwork of state regulations. A federal
regulatory regime is thus necessary to protect consumers’ financial
interests without compromising the growth of the litigation-finance
industry.
This Note contends that the best manner of regulating litigation
finance is by delegating authority to the CFPB to promulgate and
administer regulatory safeguards. To fairly and effectively balance the
consumer and financier interests discussed in Part II, these safeguards
must necessarily include creating negotiating parity between
consumers and financiers, eliminating financier control over litigation
strategy, and protecting against disclosure of privileged information. In
order for the CFPB to effectively administer these safeguards, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to require
disclosure of TPLF agreements at the outset of all litigation.
A. Constitutional Authority to Regulate TPLF
In order to authorize the CFPB to regulate TPLF, Congress must
have the authority to regulate TPLF. As the ILR has noted, “TPLF
investors operate nationally (and internationally), and use the means
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., the mails,
telecommunications, and money transfers) to carry out their
business.”140 As a result, Congress can regulate TPLF under the
commerce power as interstate commerce141 or, alternatively, as
economic activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce
under United States v. Lopez.142
Under the substantial effects test, even those litigation funders
that engage in purely intrastate financing would be subject to
regulation because, in the “aggregate,” their activities would have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.143 After Lopez, however, the
139. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 8 (arguing that most TPLF
activity is likely to occur in federal court).
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
142. 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
143. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942) (holding that intrastate activity may be regulated under the commerce power where the
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Supreme Court held in United States v. Morrison that “Lopez’s review
of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where
we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon
the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”144 After Morrison,
application of the substantial effects test to TPLF likely depends on
courts’ recognition of litigation finance as an economic activity. Given
the similarities between TPLF and the other sorts of loan and credit
activities that the federal government already regulates under the
commerce power, it is likely that TPLF would be found to be economic
activity within the scope of the substantial effects test.
B. Delegating Authority to the CFPB
The CFPB is not only constitutionally authorized to regulate
TPLF but well situated to do so. The CFPB operates as an independent
agency within the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, as
established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.145 The Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of the
agency is to “enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive.”146 The Federal Register website describes the purpose of
the CFPB as “promot[ing] fairness and transparency for mortgages,
credit cards, and other consumer financial products and services.”147
The purpose of the agency aligns neatly with regulation of the
litigation-finance industry. Atmospherically, both TPLF and the sorts
of loan and credit agreements the CFPB regulates raise the same sorts
of concerns. These include liquidity and financial risk and the potential
failure to do so would significantly limit the effectiveness of comprehensive congressional
regulation over an interstate economic activity).
144. 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (emphasis added).
145. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481–5603 (2012). It should be noted that there have been a number of
challenges in recent years to the constitutionality of the CFPB. One court has recently upheld the
agency’s structure against constitutional challenge. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing that the
CFPB’s sole director could be removed by the president only for cause). At least one other court,
however, subsequently held that the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional. See Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the
CFPB’s composition violates separation of powers requirements). The ultimate resolution of these
complex constitutional questions is uncertain and accordingly beyond the scope of this Note.
146. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
147. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/
agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
A4BX-EBLQ].
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for consumer abuse. Because TPLF agreements are similar to activities
the CFPB already regulates, the promulgation of new TPLF regulations
would come from an agency familiar with the issues TPLF presents.
The CFPB has also previously indicated a willingness to assert
regulatory authority over the litigation-finance industry. In February
2017, the CFPB, together with the New York Attorney General’s Office,
filed a lawsuit in federal court against RD Legal Funding, two related
entities, and the company’s founder for allegedly luring 9/11 victims
and National Football League concussion victims into illegal funding
agreements.148 The defendants were in the business of advancing funds
to consumers entitled to compensation under settlement agreements.149
The CFPB alleged, in part, that these transactions were falsely
marketed as assignments rather than as loans and that the lending
violated New York usury laws.150
Although the CFPB has not yet asserted regulatory authority
over presettlement litigation funding, which the bulk of this Note’s
proposals target, the agency’s willingness to subject settlement-funding
agreements to state usury laws bolsters the notion that the litigationfinance industry fits naturally within the scope of the agency’s duty to
“protect[ ] consumers in the financial marketplace” from “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”151 This does not necessarily
suggest that the regulation of presettlement litigation funding is
already within the authority of the CFPB but rather that it would be
well suited to the task if given congressional authorization.
Therefore, Congress should statutorily authorize the CFPB to
administer federal TPLF regulation.152 Through this authorization, the
CFPB should then promulgate rules instituting, at the bare minimum,
the following proposed safeguards.

148. See RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 746, 749.
149. Id. at 746.
150. Id. at 748–49; see also CFPB and New York Attorney General Sue RD Legal for Scamming
9/11 Heroes out of Millions of Dollars in Compensation Funds, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-new-yorkattorney-general-sue-rd-legal-scamming-911-heroes-out-millions-dollars-compensation-funds
[https://perma.cc/BV98-4WHM] (listing allegations against RD Legal).
151. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/the-bureau (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AW6D-TCZD].
152. Given the uncertainty of today’s political climate, it is difficult to predict when and with
whose support this legislation would pass. Such predictions are accordingly beyond the scope of
this Note.
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C. Essential Components of the Regulatory Solution
First, interest rates should be brought in line with fair
commercial practices.153 This requires setting a maximum interest rate
that TPLF financiers may charge. Specifically, a twenty-percent limit
on commercial TPLF and a ten-percent limit on consumer TPLF should
suffice. These rates would be sufficient to protect less sophisticated
consumers and discourage frivolous litigation while still facilitating
consumer- and commercial-TPLF lending. A twenty-percent
commercial-TPLF cap does not exceed the average maximum interest
rate set by states—six to twenty percent—and would thus bring
commercial-TPLF agreements more in line with what states deem to be
nonusurious lending.154 A ten-percent limit on consumer TPLF would
also be more in line with average interest rates and provide additional
protection for less sophisticated consumers—protection that is not
necessarily needed in the commercial-TPLF context (where the average
sophisticated TPLF client can more readily understand and absorb the
impact of the finance agreement).155
Limiting interest rates will likely shift the risk calculus for
financiers such that they will be less inclined to advance funds to those
suits in which their reduced recovery will not justify the risk of
advancing those funds. These limits will provide important benefits
without unreasonably limiting financier incentives. Interest caps are a
potent means of protecting against unfair lending, and in the consumerTPLF context specifically, limiting maximum interest rates will lessen
the impact of lender recovery on unsophisticated plaintiffs. Moreover,
because interest caps will lessen financiers’ potential recovery, capping
interest rates may also reduce the incentive to back suits with lower
chances of success. This would further discourage commercial and
consumer financiers from funding those suits that might be described
as frivolous.
The second necessary regulatory component involves
implementing a strict policy that limits litigation financiers’ control
over litigation strategy.156 Because TPLF financiers’ focus is to obtain a
153. See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance
Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 73–74 (2004) (discussing
examples of how litigation financiers “are making attempts to institutionalize their industry, to
improve their image by being more forthcoming on the rates they are charging, to keep those rates
closer to credit card rates, and to become more involved in their communities”).
154. See supra Section I.B; see also Cremades, supra note 1, at 160 (discussing the history of
state restrictions on interest rates).
155. See supra Section I.B.
156. See Richmond, supra note 89, at 29 (examining how litigation-funding agreements can be
structured to avoid any undue influence of financiers over litigation strategy); Steinitz & Field,
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maximum return on their investment, they have strong incentives to
exert control over decisions made by lawyers during the course of
litigation.157 Although the ABA Model Rules guide attorneys’ conduct in
protecting the objectivity of their judgment,158 the rules do not apply to
TPLF financiers, and so an explicit regulatory prohibition on financiers’
control over any aspect of a lawyer’s independent judgment is needed.
Through the promulgation of a rule expressly prohibiting financier
control, lawyers will not be asked to compromise their independent
judgment, and client interests will not take a back seat to the financiers’
interests.
The third necessary regulatory component entails expressly
limiting the types of disclosures TPLF financiers can request during
due diligence, so as to avoid conflict-of-interest issues related to
attorney work product and the attorney-client privilege.159 While
assessing whether to finance a particular suit or in monitoring a suit’s
progress, a financier could request that an attorney divulge protected
information under the terms of a finance agreement. This, in turn, could
result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection.160 To protect against privilege and work product issues
related to such disclosures, financiers’ requests should be limited to
information that would ordinarily be discoverable under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26.161
Naturally, this disclosure limitation cannot be so onerous as to
deprive financiers of information necessary to value a suit, so the CFPB
should promulgate rules to permit certain additional disclosures as are
deemed necessary to facilitate access to funding. The decision of what
additional disclosures are necessary should rely heavily on whether
supra note 67, at 728 (advocating for a model litigation-funding contract in which financiers gain
“influence over the litigation, but not control”).
157. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 22 (“ALF suppliers are businesses, operated
with the goal of maximizing return on investments. The investments are in legal claims, acquired
in whole or in part. The interests of a supplier in any given transaction, therefore, will be to
maximize the expected value of a legal claim.”).
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that
“independent judgment” is one of the “essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship with a
client”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting
compensation from a third party unless “there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence
of professional judgment”).
159. See Molot, supra note 105, at 391, 420 (discussing conflict-of-interest issues related to
TPLF agreement disclosures and noting that “the same common interest privilege that is often
invoked when litigants need to share information with conventional liability insurers and potential
acquirers” should extend to disclosures to litigation financiers).
160. J. Randolph Evans & Shari L. Klevens, The Growing Acceptance of Litigation Finance,
LAW.COM (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://www.law.com/sites/dailyreportonline/2017/10/09/thegrowing-acceptance-of-litigation-finance [https://perma.cc/36DT-C67B].
161. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (listing the general provisions governing discovery).
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disclosure of the requested type of information is ordinarily protected
by the work product doctrine or if disclosure would fall within the
common-interest exception of the attorney-client privilege.162 Under
these guidelines, the implementation of disclosure limits would protect
attorney and client interests without significantly burdening TPLF
financiers’ ability to conduct due diligence.
Lastly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended
to mandate disclosure of TPLF agreements in all litigation.163 Although
federal courts may already have discretion to order the production of
TPLF agreements during discovery—at least one court has adopted a
local rule requiring disclosure of TPLF agreements in class-action
suits164—mandating disclosure in all suits will promote transparency
and aid the CFPB in ensuring compliance with the aforementioned
safeguards. And as the ILR has noted, “[B]ecause many states have
modeled their rules of civil procedure on the federal rules and
periodically adopt changes in the federal rules for use in their own
courts,” amending the federal rules would likely lead to changes in state
rules as well, which further promotes CFPB administration of the
safeguards.165
Mandating disclosure up front will also promote speedy
determinations related to cost shifting—which ultimately leads to more
efficient use of judicial resources—and will allow courts to police the
ethical obligations of attorneys more readily. Moreover, because courts
may already require disclosure of TPLF agreements, it is unlikely this
amendment would have any significant impact on financiers’ interests.
CONCLUSION
TPLF is now a powerful and influential industry that will play
a significant role in reshaping the legal landscape. At present, the
important interests of parties engaging TPLF services, along with the
sheer amount of funding being infused into the legal system overall,
162. For further discussion of the common-interest exception and work product doctrine in
relation to TPLF, see ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 34–36.
163. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 14 (arguing that Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 7.1 and 28 should be amended to require disclosure of third-party-funder
identities and relevant investment details).
164. N.D. CAL. R. 3-15; Ben Hancock, Northern District, First in Nation, Mandates Disclosure
of Third-Party Funding in Class Actions, LAW.COM (Jan. 23, 2017, 10:07 PM),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202777487488 [https://perma.cc/K8XP-5CNQ] (“The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Monday announced a new rule
requiring the automatic disclosure of third-party funding agreements in proposed class-action
lawsuits, walking back from an earlier proposal for broader transparency requirements.”).
165. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 86, at 8 (arguing that most TPLF
activity is likely to occur in federal court).
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warrant careful oversight to ensure that litigation finance is fair and
equitable. On the other hand, litigation finance has greatly improved
the ability of plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims and has provided
commercial entities with a new and useful budgeting and riskspreading tool. To best promote the interests of consumers and
financiers alike, a federal regulatory regime administered by the CFPB
along with a mandatory-disclosure requirement under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should be implemented.
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